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Using  the  Indonesian  Family  Life  Survey,  this  study  investigates 
whether  Indonesian  farmers  respond  differently  to  income  shocks 
(crop  loss)  depending  on  the  level  of  their  asset  ownership,  and 
whether their responses are aimed at preserving consumption levels or 
at  accumulating  assets.  We  consider  a  framework  in  which  assets 
contribute directly to the income generation process. In this context the 
need  to  accumulate  assets  to  ensure  future  income  may  lead  poor 
farmers (those with a low level of productive assets) to behave quite 
differently  in  terms  of  both  their  responses  to  shocks  and  their 
consumption decisions. For them transitory shocks may have long term 
consequences  when  the  income  loss  leads  to  changes  in  their  asset 
investment decisions. Our results suggest that while non-poor farmers 
smooth  consumption  relative  to  income,  poor  households  use  labor 
supply to compensate the income loss and, on average, they save half 
of this extra income. These results confirm the importance of savings 
for  poor  households,  and  highlight  a  crucial  role  for  policies  that 
support  savings  or,  more  precisely,  the  accumulation  of  productive 
assets. 
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1  Introduction and literature review 
A  growing  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  analyzes  the  effects  of  shocks  on 
households’ living conditions in developing countries, and on the coping strategies adopted to 
overcome  them.  Previous  studies  investigate  whether  specific  risk-coping  strategies  are 
responsive to shocks (Pan 2007; Udry 1995; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; McPeak 2004; 
Kochar 1999), or whether consumption can be smoothed in  relation  to transitory  income 
changes  (Paxson  1992;  Gertler  and  Gruber  2002;  Kazianga  and  Udry  2004;  Jalan  and 
Ravallion 1997).  
When analyzing households’ responses to shocks a central issue to be considered is the 
role of assets: when the latter contribute directly to the income generation process (productive 
assets), shocks may have different consequences and lead to different behavior. In this context 
there  is a  trade-off  between  asset  investment  and  consumption  choices,  in  the  sense  that 
selling  assets  or  slowing  down  asset  accumulation  could  have  important  implications  for 
future income and, hence, for future consumption. This implies that transitory shocks may 
have long term consequences when the income loss leads to changes in the asset investment 
decisions.  Empirical  studies  show  that  below  a  given  asset  threshold,  households  reduce 
consumption in order to preserve their stock of assets (asset smoothing), while above that 
threshold assets are sold to protect consumption (consumption smoothing) (Barrett and Carter 
2005; Zimmerman and Carter 2003). Similarly, Hoddinott (2006) shows that the probability 
of selling assets (animals) in the face of a negative-income shock depends on the prior level of 
assets. 
This work considers the most frequent shock in rural Indonesia, crop loss, and uses the 
1993 round of the Indonesian Family Life Survey to explore whether Indonesian farmers 
respond differently to this shock depending on the level of their asset ownership. We focus on 
farm  households  because  their  main  source  of  income  (farm  profits)  depends  on  asset 
holdings.  
Various studies have shown that households cope with shocks by adjusting labor supply 
(Kochar  1999;  Maitra  2001;  Cameron  and  Worswick  2003).  In  this  way,  consumption 
smoothing is achieved through ex post income smoothing (Morduch 1995; Dercon 2002). In 
particular, Cameron and Worswick (2003) study the way in which labor supply responses 
enable  Indonesian  households  to  smooth  consumption  in  the  face  of  a  crop  loss
1.  Their 
                                                
1  “Employment  and  wages  are  likely  to  be  more  flexible  in  largely  agricultural  societies  in  which  a  high 
proportion of the workforce is self-employed or works in the informal sector” (Manning 2000, p. 130). The case 
of Indonesia is consistent with this framework. The flexibility of Indonesian labor markets and the availability of  
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approach and results suggest that crop loss is a transitory shock which, in the absence of 
changes in the labor supply, leads to transitory welfare losses. The need to accumulate assets 
is not considered by the authors; rather their estimates suggest that all households have a 
marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income close to 0.9 (statistically different 
from one). This means that households only save when facing positive transitory shocks. 
While this seems reasonable above a certain threshold of assets, it appears very unlikely for 
asset poor households.  
This work extends the approach of  Cameron and  Worswick (2003), and  considers the 
interlinkage  between  production  and  consumption  decisions.  In  particular,  we  distinguish 
between small, medium and large farms according to the level of productive assets, and we 
explore the way in which the need to accumulate assets affects the behavior of the small ones 
(which we call also “poor households”). In order to do so we estimate quantitative measures 
of the income loss and the household’s ability to recover from the shock, as well as the 
marginal  propensity  to  consume  out  of  both  permanent  and  transitory  income.  These 
estimates would help us to understand differences in the consumption behavior between asset 
poor  and  non-poor  households,  and  whether  permanent  income  is  an  appropriate  welfare 
indicator for both groups.  
Our results show that household responses do actually differ according to the level of asset 
ownership: while medium and large farms smooth consumption relative to income, small ones 
use labor supply to compensate the income loss and, on average, they save half of this extra 
income.  This  implies  that,  for  poor  households,  the  extra  income  generated  by  the  labor 
supply response to shocks not only enable them to protect consumption, avoiding transitory 
welfare  losses,  but  supports  the  asset  accumulation  process,  thus  reducing  long  term 
consequences.  This  strengthens  Cameron  and  Worswick’s  (2003)  conclusion  about  the 
importance of the development of rural labor markets. However, when asset accumulation is 
the key determinant of household welfare, policies that support savings or, more specifically, 
the accumulation of productive assets, may be even more important than the development of 
labor markets.  
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in section II. Section 
III discusses the data. Section IV and V present the empirical methodology and the results, 
and section VI concludes.  
                                                                                                                                                   
alternative employment opportunities for those who lose their jobs, mostly in small-scale enterprises and in the 
informal sector, supported the adjustments in labor supply as one important aspect of the response to shocks, 
even in the face of the economic crisis of 1997-98 (Manning 2000).     4 
2  Theoretical Framework 
The model developed in this section is a simple intertemporal model with a household 
farming  production  function  subject  to  exogenous  income  shocks.  Leisure  and  asset 
investment decisions are included in the household optimization problem. Assets are defined 
as productive (farm assets) and non-productive (financial assets). They have direct effects on 
income  levels,  and  can  also  serve  as  a  buffer  to  smooth  consumption  against  shocks 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Zimmerman and Carter 2003; Newhouse 2005).  
The farm profit function is defined as  ) , , ( 1 t
f
t t ft s h − Φ = Π π , where 
f
t h  is the labor input, 
1 − Φt  is the level of productive and unproductive assets owned by the household at the end of 
the previous year, and s is a transitory random shock. Shocks are assumed exogenous, and 
uncorrelated  over  time.  Farm  profits  increase  with  positive  shocks,  and  decrease  as  a 
consequence of negative shocks, such that  0 / > ∂ Π ∂ s . The total income of the household 
comes from farm and off-farm labor. In this paper, we are not interested in examining the 
trade-off between farm and non-farm labor and, hence, we assume that household members 
work a fixed amount of hours on the family farm, so that 
f
t h  is exogenous, and varies with s 
(negative shocks reduce 
f
t h ). The remaining time endowment (
f
s t T T h = − ) can be allocated 
to either leisure ( t l ) or off-farm work. Let 
w
t y  be the income earned by family members on 
wage employment, i.e.  ( )
w
t t s t y w T l = − .  
Total household income can be written as:  
1 ( , , ) ( )
f
t ft t t t t s t I h s w T l − = Π Φ + − .  (1) 
Assets
2 evolve according to: 
t t t φ + Φ = Φ −1   (2) 
where  t φ  is the amount of assets purchased or sold at time t (for simplicity we assume no 
depreciation and no interest rate).  
The budget constraint that the household faces is given by: 
t t t I p c = + Φ ) (φ   (3) 
                                                
2 As mentioned above, assets are a broad definition and include both productive and non-productive assets. 
However, considering a sample of farm households, it is reasonable to suppose that productive assets constitute 
the majority of total assets owned by the households.   
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where the price of the consumption good is normalized to one, and  Φ p  is the price of 
assets. Households can either sell productive assets or decrease financial assets to increase 
consumption. However, we assume that households face a constraint on assets defined as 
(Newhouse 2005): 
) (Z t Φ ≥ Φ   (4) 
i.e., there is an asset threshold (that may depend on household characteristics, Z) below 
which no profits are generated
3. As a consequence, 
) , ( 1 − Φ ≥ t t Z g φ   (5) 
The farm profit equation written above, shows that future productivity is a function of 
current asset accumulation strategies. Today’s sale of assets has important implications for 
future income and, hence, for future consumption. This form of non-separability between 
current and future consumption leads households, and especially poor households, to be more 
cautious in running down assets in the face of transitory shocks. Thus, the trade off captured 
in this model is not only between consumption and off-farm labor, but also between current 
consumption and asset accumulation for future consumption (Zimmerman and Carter 2003). 
Each period’s utility function is defined as  ( , ) t t t u c l , where we allow for consumption and 
leisure choices to be non-separable (Kochar 1999; Kazianga and Udry 2004); to be more 
specific, we assume that  0 /
2 > ∂ ∂ ∂ l c ut .  
The household’s Bellman equation is defined as: 
{ } 1 1 1 1 , ( , ) max ( ( , ) ( ) , ) ( , )
t t
t t t ft t t t s t t t t t t t l V s u s w T l p l EV s
ϕ ϕ β − − Φ + + Φ = Π Φ + − − + Φ   (6) 



















∂ ∂  = ∂ ∂Φ 
∂ ∂  =
∂ ∂ 
  (7) 
                                                
3 For productive assets, this threshold is assumed to be positive,  0 ) ( > Φ Z . Subtracting  1 − Φt  from both sides, 
the  constraint  becomes  1 1 ) ( − − Φ − Φ ≥ Φ − Φ t t t Z ,  i.e.  1 ) ( − Φ − Φ ≥ t t Z φ .  The  reduced  form  becomes 
) , ( 1 − Φ ≥ t t Z g φ  (equation (5)).  
4 For simplicity, we do not consider the time constraint.    6 
Equations (7a) and (7b) solve the trade off between consumption and asset purchase, and 
between consumption and leisure, respectively. Looking at equation (7a), a negative shock 
that  decreases  farm  profits  will  increase  the  marginal  utility  of  income,  all  else  equal. 
Assuming the value function is concave in assets, the household must increase consumption 
and decrease  t Φ  in order to maintain the equality, i.e. the household will choose a lower level 
of  t φ . A similar result comes from equation (7b). A negative shock increases the marginal 
utility of income, all else equal, and decreases the marginal dis-utility of off-farm work
5. To 
maintain the equality (7b) the household reduces  t l . Hence, in the face of a negative shock, 
households reduce the amount of assets (by either buying less or selling productive assets, or 
by reducing financial assets), and/or increase the labor market participation to overcome the 
hardship.  
Equation  (7)  holds  only  if  the  household  is  not  constrained  in  period  t,  i.e.  if 
) , ( 1 − Φ > t t t Z g φ . If the constraint is binding,  ) , ( 1 − Φ = t t t Z g φ , the first-order conditions take 


















∂ ∂  = + ∂ ∂Φ 
∂ ∂  =
∂ ∂ 
  (8) 
where  t γ  is the multiplier for the constraint. Equation (8a) means that the marginal utility 
of consumption for constrained households is greater than the marginal utility that would be 
optimal without constraints. Substituting (8b) into (8a), we can see that also the marginal 
utility of leisure is larger for constrained households. This implies that, in general, constrained 
households consume less and work more than if they were unconstrained, and these effects 
are even more pronounced when faced with a negative shock.  
In the empirical analysis we will use the theoretical prediction of this model to guide the 






                                                
5 This derives from  0 /
2 > ∂ ∂ ∂ l c ut  and from the effect of a negative shock on Ts.  
  7 
3  The Data 
The data used for this study are from the 1993 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS1) 
(Frankenberg and Thomas 2000). 7224 households were interviewed over a wide range of 
issues. Only those households that supplied a complete set of income and demographic data 
are included in the dataset. After dropping income and asset outliers (about 1% of the total 
sample), and focusing on the rural area, the sample includes 3601 rural households; of these, 
2183 are farm households, defined as those who reported they owned a farm and at least one 
farm asset in the year of the survey. Respondents were asked whether their household had 
experienced an economic shock in the past five years, the type of shock, when it happened 
(year and month), what measures were taken, and the costs of overcoming the shock. The 
survey permits only one occurrence of the same shock in the period 1989-93 to be reported by 
the same household, and there is evidence that the most recent shocks are more likely to be 
reported
6.  
Nearly 34% of the total rural sample has experienced at least one shock in the past 5 years. 
The incidence of the different types of shocks is reported in table 1. The most frequent shocks 
are  sickness  and  crop  loss,  whereas  business  loss  and  unemployment  affect  only  a  few 
households. Focusing on the farm sample, the percentage of households that suffered a crop 
loss is nearly 24%. Column six of table 1 reports the medians of the percentage of farmers 
that experienced the same shock in the same village in 1993, considering only villages in 
which there is at least one household reporting the shock. As expected, crop loss is the most 
common shock, with a median percentage of 6.7 (and a maximum of 40%).  
Since crop loss is the most frequent shock in rural Indonesia, and one of the major sources 
of risk in poor rural areas, in the empirical analysis we will focus on this type of shock. This 
choice clearly raises some issues about which sample is to be used. Cameron and Worswick 
(2003)  use  the  entire  sample  of  rural  households.  Crop  loss  is  a  shock  that  affects  both 
households  that  have  some  farm  production  and  farm  workers.  As  suggested  in  the 
introduction, shocks may have different consequences and may lead to different behavior in 
the two cases. For farm households, assets enter directly in the income generation process and 
the trade-off between asset accumulation and consumption choices is different than the one 
for farm workers. Hence, we restrict the sample to farm households
7.  
 
                                                
6 For example, 31% of the crop loss experienced in the period 1988-93, are reported to occur in 1993, and 63% 
in 1992-93. 
7 As table 1 shows, only 22 non farm households (out of 560) reported a crop loss in the previous five years. 
Focusing on the year of the survey (1993), they reduce to 3 (out of 166).    8 
Table 1 
Number of households reporting shocks by type of shock (1988-93) 
Rural sample    Farm sample 
Type of shock   
Nr. of 




households  per cent 
Commonality 
(1993) – medians* 
Death    284  7.9    174  7.9  3.7 
Sickness    376  10.4    232  10.5  3.9 
Crop loss    560  15.6    538  24.3  6.7 
Disaster    63  1.8    41  1.9  3.7 
Unemployment     65  1.8    25  1.1  3.9 
Price falls     239  6.6    215  9.7  4.2 
Note.  The  table  reports  the  number  of  rural  and  farm  households,  and  the  percentage  of  all 
households, reporting shocks of each type over the five year period 1988-93. 
* The commonality of shocks is the percentage of households reporting the same shock in the 
same  village  in  1993.  Villages  with  no  households  reporting  shocks  are  excluded  from  the 
median. 
 
Table 2 shows the percentage of farm households that use different measures in response to 
crop losses reported for the period 1988-93 and for 1993 only
8. Nearly 40% of the total 
respondents report taking an extra job to overcome a crop loss. Other important responses are 
“cut down on household expenses”, “take a loan” and “sell assets”. Indonesian data confirm 
the  suggestion  of  the  literature  that  informal  insurance  mechanisms,  such  as  family  and 
community assistance, may be used less in the face of common shocks, like for example crop 
loss (Alderman and Paxson 1992). As the percentage of households that experience the same 
shock in the same village increases, the community may provide less insurance against it. 
The importance of different responses is likely to vary according to the wealth or size of 
the farm and, hence, table 2 reports also the percentages of responses by farm-assets quartiles, 
where the bottom 25% of the asset distribution identifies small farms. Henceforth, we define 
these households as poor ones ('asset poverty').  
As  pointed  out  by  other  authors  (Kochar  1999;  Newhouse  2005,  Maitra  2001),  labor 
supply adjustment is a measure used particularly by poor farmers. Indeed, the percentage of 
households that take an extra job decreases as we move from poor to rich farmers. Owners of 
large farms are more likely to run down assets and to use savings than owners of small farms, 
                                                
8 In the estimation we consider only crop losses reported for the year 1993, because we observe consumption 
only for this year. Therefore we check whether responses to this shock in 1993 are similar to those reported for 
the previous 5 years.  
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even if the percentage of households that use savings remains low (poor farmers may need to 
build a stock of assets to protect themselves from future risk and/or to finance investments).  
By examining the main differences between small, medium and large farms reported in the 
Appendix, table A1, it is possible to see that the higher propensity of small farms to use labor 
supply,  is  not  correlated  with  a  significantly  larger  household  size  or  other  demographic 
characteristics.  Indeed,  the  only  significant  difference  (except  the  obvious  one  related  to 
assets  and  income
9)  is  in  the  number  of  household  members  with  secondary  and  higher 
education. Therefore, it seems that the adoption of different strategies may be more related to 
the values of farm-assets than to other household characteristics. This descriptive evidence 
suggests that it is important to distinguish between small and large farms in the analysis of 
income and consumption smoothing behavior.  
 
Table 2 
Responses to a crop loss by type of coping strategy and by farm-assets percentiles 
    1993    1988-93 
Type  of  coping 
strategy    Total    Total  Bottom 25%  25-50%  50-75%  Top 25% 
Extra job    39.2    45.0  54.6  50.0  43.9  30.7 
Loan    20.0    21.2  24.8  18.0  13.0  29.2 
Sell assets    17.5    20.0  14.2  15.6  25.2  25.4 
Family assistance    7.2    6.9  3.5  9.4  8.6  6.2 
Savings    5.4    4.5  0.7  2.3  3.6  11.4 
Reduce expenses    29.0    20.8  22.0  23.4  22.3  15.4 
Note. The numbers represent percentages of farms. Because of multiple responses, percentages sum to 
more than 100%. 
                                                
9 Table A1 (Appendix) shows that households that we defined as poor on the basis of the level of their farm 
assets, are also poor in terms of non-farm assets (both business and non-business) and household income.     10 
4  Empirical Methodology 
This section estimates a quantitative measure of the income reduction produced by the crop 
loss, and of the household’s ability to recover from the shock. Several methodologies have 
been  used  to  measure  income  shocks.  Rosenzweig  (1988)  uses  the  difference  between  a 
household  current  income  and  its  mean  income  over  the  nine-year  period.  Jacoby  and 
Skoufias (1997) define the idiosyncratic  shock as the deviation of  the change in log full 
income  from  the  village-season-year  mean  change,  and  the  aggregate  shock  as  the  mean 
change itself. Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006) measure transitory crop shocks using the 
reported values of crop loss (due to insects, rodents, and other calamities). Kochar (1999) 
measures  income  shock  as  the  residual  from  a  regression  of  crop  profits  on  variables 
determining the household’s expectations of profits (a set of household dummy variables, 
reflecting all time-invariant factors, and a set of time-varying demographic variables). Paxson 
(1992) measures the transitory income component regressing total household income on a set 
of  variables  that  affect transitory  income  (in  her  study,  this  set  consists  of  deviations  of 
rainfall from its average level).  
 
We use a two step procedure to estimate the permanent and transitory income components. 
In the first stage we estimate permanent income only for the group of households with no crop 
loss
10,  and  use  these  estimated  coefficients  to  predict  income  for  all  households.  Our 
methodology  leads  to  consistent  estimates  under  the  assumption  that  the  crop  loss  is 
exogenous. In the second stage the difference between observed income and predicted income 
for  households  that  experienced  a  crop  loss  in  1993  is  constructed.  This  difference  is 
regressed on a set of variables that affect the magnitude of the income shock (e.g. farm assets) 
and the household’s ability to cope ex post with the hardship. 
Alternatively, we could estimate permanent and transitory income by regressing household 
income on a vector of variables that permanently affect it, on self-reported shocks (crop loss), 
and on the coping strategies adopted using the sample of all households. Our methodology 
provides a better measure of permanent income when there are some unobservable variables 
that affect the reported income of households who experienced a crop loss and are correlated 
with some household characteristics used to estimate the permanent income component (e.g. 
                                                
10 It is worth noting, however, that estimating permanent income, using cross-sectional data instead of panel 
data, does not allow one to model the dynamics of predicted income, nor to solve the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity (Abul Naga and Bolzani 2000).    
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transfers form relatives and friends which may be correlated with the number of children in 
the household). 
More precisely, we define income for households that do not report a crop loss as: 
0 1 2
P T
h h h h Y X X α α α ε = + + +     (9) 
where  Yh  is  the  1993  household  income, 
P
h X   is  a  vector  of  variables  that  determine 
permanent income (demographic characteristics, location dummies, and wealth indicators), 
and 
T
h X  is a set of other variables that may affect household income in a transitory way 
(winnings, and gift from family/friends). The parameters in (9) can be consistently estimated 
by applying OLS to the sub-sample of households with no crop loss under the assumption that 
the crop loss is exogenous
11.  
 
For  households  that  reported  a  crop  loss  in  1993,  the  difference  between  actual  and 
predicted income is constructed:  
ˆ CL
h h h Y Y Y ∆ = −   (10) 
where 
CL
h Y  is the current income for households that reported a crop loss, and  h Y ˆ  is the 
predicted income for these households, on the basis of the parameter estimates from equation 
(9). This difference can be explained by the sum of the loss produced by the shock and the 
gains from the ex post coping strategies that are reflected in the reported income (plus the 
effects of unobservables). To obtain a measure of the crop loss and of the increase in income 










h h u X X X X Y + + + + + = ∆ 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β   (11) 
where 
S




h X  and 
L
h X  are vectors of variables that determine the size of the 
                                                
11 Experiencing or reporting a shock may be correlated with pre-shock household characteristics. Given this 
potential endogeneity of self-reported crop losses, we looked at the distribution of pre-shock characteristics 
(mainly the value of pre-shock assets owned by the household) of the control group (those who reported no 
shock) and the treated group (those that reported a shock). No statistically significant differences in the means 
are  observed.  We  estimated  also  a  treatment-effect  model,  and  we  reject  the  hypothesis  of  endogeneity  of 
reported crop losses. 
12 As a check for the validity of using the estimates of equation (9) to construct the dependent variable in (11), 
the  following  equation  is  estimated:  0 1 2 3 4 5 ˆ CL S A LS L
h h h h h h h Y X X X X Y u β β β β β β = + + + + + + ;  5 ˆ β   is 
found not to be statistically different from one (F(1,148)=2.46, Prob>F=0.12).  
13 To account for possible non-linearity in the functional form, the coefficient on farm assets is interacted with 
dummies that indicate whether the farm is small, medium or large (defined as those with 1992 farm assets in the 
bottom 25%, 25-75%, and in the top 25% of the asset distribution, respectively).   12 
increase in income due to “labor supply” and “sell assets or take a loan”, respectively. 
A
h X  is 
the value of 1992 non-productive assets owned by the household
14.  
The extra labor income given by the labor supply response is estimated using the dummy 
labor supply (self-reported strategy) interacted with the number of household members aged 
13-64. Following Cameron and Worswick (2003) and Kochar (1995), households with more 
people of working age may increase their labor supply by more.  
Least squares estimation of (11) may lead to biased estimates of the parameters because of 
the endogeneity of the labor supply response. In order to account for this, we estimate a probit 
equation  for  the  labor  supply  response  and  we  derive  the  appropriate  selection  terms. 
Equation (11) thus becomes: 
0 1 2 3 4 12 02
ˆ ˆ ( ) ( )
(1 ) ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 ( )
S A LS L h h
h h h h h h h h h
h h
f Z f Z
Y X X X X LS LS CL u
F Z F Z
δ δ
β β β β β σ σ
δ δ
∆ = + + + + + + − +
−
 
  (12) 
where LSh is the dummy for labor supply responses to crop loss, CLh is the dummy for 
crop loss in 1993,  02 σ and  12 σ  are the covariances between the error terms on the income 
equations for the two sub-samples ( 0 h LS =  and  1 h LS = , respectively) and the error term in 
the probit equation.  
We performed a Chow test to check whether all coefficients are the same for  0 h LS =  and 
1 h LS = , and we cannot reject this hypothesis (F(6,149)=0.84, Prob>F=0.54). Therefore, we 
use (12) to estimate three different shock measures: the income reduction caused by the crop 
loss (equation (13)), the income variation that includes the labor supply response (equation 
(14)), and the total effect of the shock (the sum of income loss and income gains; equation 
(15)):  
1 0 1 ˆ ˆ ˆS S
h h Y X β β = +   (13) 
2 0 1 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆS S LS
h h h Y X X β β β = + +   (14) 
3 0 1 2 3 4 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆS S A LS L
h h h h h Y X X X X β β β β β = + + + +   (15) 
Following Deaton (1997), the consumption equation can be written as
15:   
                                                
14  Non-business  and  non-farm  assets  are  added  as  additional  regressors  because  the  measure  of  household 
income includes the income from the rent/lease/profit-sharing of non-business assets. 
15 A similar approach has been used by Paxson (1992) and Cameron and Worswick (2003). They estimate the 
level of household savings as a linear function of permanent income, transitory income, the residual from the 
income equation (unexplained income), and a set of variables that measure the life-cycle stage of the households.  
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0 1 2 1 3 4 5
6 7 8
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
ˆ ˆ (1 )
P S LS A L
h h h h h h h h h h
h h h h h h
C Y Y CL Y CL Y CL Y CL
u CL CL Z
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ ε γ ν
= + + ⋅ + + +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ − + +
  (16) 
where  h C   is  household  consumption  (measured  by  non-durable  annual  household 
expenses
16),  ˆP
h Y   is  the  permanent  income component,  1 ˆS
h Y   is  the  measure  of  the  income 
reduction due to the crop loss (equation (13)),  ˆLS
h Y  is the extra labor income, and  ˆ ˆ ,
A L
h h Y Y  are 
the predicted income gains due to other coping strategies (non-business assets and “take a 
loan or sell assets”, respectively)
17.  h u ˆ  and  h ε ˆ  are the fitted residuals from income equations 
(12) and (9) respectively, and  h Z  is a set of variables that measure the life-cycle stage of the 
household.  Following  Paxson  (1992),  the  variables  included  in  h Z   are  the  number  of 
household members in each age category.  
From equation (16) we can estimate the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent 
and  transitory  income.  To  examine  the  different  behavior  of  asset  poor  and  non-poor 
households, both the permanent income and the measure of the crop loss are interacted with 
dummies  to  identify  small,  medium  and  large  farms.  As  noted  in  the  introduction,  these 
estimates  would  help  us  to  understand  whether  poor  households  do  actually  accumulate 
assets,  which  income  measure  drives  household  consumption  behavior,  and  whether 







                                                                                                                                                   
Paxson includes also the variability  of the household’s income. From their results, Cameron and Worswick 
conclude that the increase in income due to the labor supply response is important in allowing rural households 
to smooth consumption: households that do not change their labor supply when facing the shock, reduce their 
expenditure by about 79% of the loss in income due to the crop loss. Note that their approach and results imply 
that all households that do not adopt the labor supply response, whether poor or non-poor, reduce consumption 
in the face of a shock. Using their methodology on the farm sample instead of the entire rural sample, and 
distinguishing between small and medium/large farms, we find that non-poor farmers (medium and large farms) 
insure  consumption  without  having  to  rely  on  the  labor  market,  whereas  owners  of  small  farms  (poor 
households) are found to reduce consumption even when they increase labor supply. 
16 The expenditure variable used in this paper includes the total value of goods self-produced by the household. 
Durable goods are not included because it is difficult to impute the appropriate measure of the service flow 
derived from them. 
17 Few papers estimate a quantitative measure of the increase in income due to ex post responses to shocks 
(Fafchamps et al. 1998; Cameron and Worswick 2003). However, none of these papers examines how much of 
the increase in income due to different coping strategies is passed onto consumption.   14 
5  Results 
5.1  Income equation estimates 
Estimates of the income equation for households that did not experience the crop loss 
(equation (9)) are reported in the Appendix (table A3). To account for the non-linearity of the 
income  function,  the  coefficient  on  farm  assets  is  interacted  with  dummies  that  indicate 
whether the farm is small, medium or large (defined according to quartiles of 1992 farm 
assets distribution). Results are in line with standard income equation estimates. Coefficients 
on all types of assets are highly significant
18, and those on farm assets confirm the non-
linearity of the income function. Households whose head has a secondary/higher education or 
is employed in the private and government sector have a higher income, all else equal. Other 
variables  that  have  a  significant  effect  on  household  income  are  the  number  of  income 
earners, other than that of the head, and non-labor income sources (such as gifts and winnings, 
and the presence of a household member that receives a pension).  
These estimates of the income equation are used to calculate the difference between the 
observed income and the “expected” income ( h Y ∆  in equation (10)) for households that report 
a crop loss in 1993. As can be noted from table 3, the resulting “gross” income loss, i.e. the 
measured income loss including all recovering measures, for these households is on average 
about 45 thousands of rupiah, but there is a high variability around the mean. For households 
that report labor supply response we obtain a positive mean difference between realized and 
predicted  income  (175  thousands  of  rupiah),  whereas  the  mean  is  negative  for  the  other 
households (-187 thousands of rupiah)
19.  
                                                
18 It should be recalled that the profit function is expressed in the theoretical model as a function of assets at time 
t-1;  therefore,  we  use  the  previous  year’s  level  of  assets.  Non-business  and  non-farm  assets  are  added  as 
additional regressors because the measure of household income includes the income from the rent/lease/profit-
sharing of non-business assets.  
19 The difference in the means for the two groups is statistically significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of the difference in incomes for households that 
reported a crop loss in 1993 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  p25  p50  p75 
CL
h Y ∆   163  -44.57  -627.51  -219.32  221.84 
CL
h Y ∆ *LS  64  175.01  -653.88  -125.87  374.12 
CL
h Y ∆ *(1-LS)  99  -186.52  -600.46  -302.18  136.30 
Note. The descriptive statistics differentiate between households that adopted the labor 
supply response (LS=1) and those who did not (LS=0). The difference in the means is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
In  order  to  identify  the  main  components  of  the  estimated  difference  in  income,  we 
estimate equation  (12) that includes the appropriate selection terms for the  probability  of 
using labor supply. As regards the latter, the probit estimates reported in the Appendix (table 
A4)
  20 show that the probability of adopting labor supply decreases with the possibility of 
access to the credit market (captured by the value of the land and the presence of at least one 
financial institution in the village)
 21, with the quality of the soil (farmers that cultivate a high-
quality  soil  have  higher  farm  profits
22  and,  hence,  they  may  rely  on  other  risk-coping 
strategies), and with the number of adult members with secondary education. These results 
suggest that, as already observed in the descriptive analysis (table 2), rich households that can 
rely on high and good-quality assets are unlikely to change their labor supply decisions after 
the occurrence of a crop loss. Other variables that have a negative effect on the probability of 
adjusting labor supply as the result of a crop loss are the age of the head and the presence of 
an  inactive  spouse.  The  number  of  female  household  members  aged  13-17  and  the 
commonality of the shock have a positive and significant effect.  
As  the  estimates  of  equation  (12)  reported  in  table  4  show,  the  difference  between 
observed and predicted income for households who experienced a crop loss is the result of a 
reduction in income due to the shock and some recovery measures adopted as a response to it. 
                                                
20 The probit model is estimated over the sample of households that reported a crop loss over the past five years 
to increase the number of observations.  
21 This is in line with the results of Maitra (2001) who finds that Indian farmers with unrestricted access to credit 
(medium and large farms) deal with shocks by using state contingent transfers (for example credit), and without 
changing their leisure and consumption behavior. On the contrary, constrained farmers (small farms) are able to 
insure consumption against unanticipated income changes only if they adjust their market participation in 
response to the shock, shifting from own-farm work to the labor market.  
22 Farmers living in villages with a high soil-quality have farm profits that are statistically higher (at 0.01% level) 
than other farmers.    16 
The former depends on the level of asset ownership: the estimated coefficients on farm assets 
are all negative and significant, but they decrease, in absolute value, as we move from small 
to large farms. This finding may be explained with the nonlinearity of the profit function. 
With decreasing returns on farm assets, the marginal effect of an increase in assets on the 
income loss is larger for low than for high levels of assets.  
The ability of recovering from the shock depends on both the value of non-farm assets and 
changes in labor supply decisions. In particular, the 1992 value of non-business and non-farm 
assets has a positive effect, indicating that rich households have a higher ability to recover 
from the shock (even if the t statistic is not very high; t=1.52). The income gain due to the 
labor  supply  response  is  related  to  the  number  of  household  members  aged  13-64:  each 
member aged 13-64 allows households to gain about 433 thousands of rupiah of extra labor 
income after a crop loss.  
From this regression, we construct the measures of the income reduction caused by the 
crop  loss  and  of  the  income  gains  due  to  labor  supply  response.  Predicted  measures  are 
summarized in table 5. The income reduction caused by the crop loss (1ˆS
h Y  in equation (13)) 
does not vary significantly with the size of the farm, and the mean is about 1277 thousands of 
rupiah. The average value of the income gain due to labor supply response is 1298 thousands 
of rupiah, suggesting a significant impact of this coping strategy (considering only households 
that use extra labor the mean value of the income loss plus the extra labor income is about 87 
thousands of rupiah, i.e. on average they recover all the income loss). The total effect of the 
shock ( 3ˆS
h Y  in equation (15)) is, on average, positive for households that use the labor supply 
response (252 thousands of rupiah) and negative for the others (-953 thousands of rupiah).  
  17 
 
Table 4 
Income equation estimates 
Variables  Coeff.  t 
Measure of income loss      
1992 farm assets*small farm  -2.03  -2.11 
1992 farm assets*medium farm  -0.12  -2.13 
1992 farm assets*large farm  -0.02  -2.62 
Recovery’s measures     
1992 non-business assets  0.05  1.52 
LS*N_1364  432.71  2.34 
  Dummy sell assets or take a loan  353.97  1.29 
Other variables     
1
st selection term* LS  -121.35  -0.23 
2
nd selection term* (1-LS)  -1130.89  -2.40 
 Dummy cut expenditure  140.04  0.72 
Intercept  -1001.04  -2.66 
Number of obs= 163 
F( 9,  153) =   3.05 
R-squared=  0.21 
Note. The table reports the results from equation (12), and estimates the 
size of the income reduction due to the crop loss and of the increase in 
income due to coping strategies. The sample is households that had a crop 
loss  in  1993.  Both  income  and  assets  are  measured  in  thousands  of 
rupiah. Standard errors are robust.   18 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics of predicted variables 
Variable  p25  Mean  p50  p75 
Income reduction due to the crop loss ( ) 1 0 1 ˆ ˆ ˆS S
h h Y X β β = +  
Total sample  -1382.41  -1277.25  -1171.58  -1104.73 
Small farms  -1549.70  -1253.68  -1090.45  -1035.58 
Medium farms  -1378.13  -1258.26  -1222.68  -1138.44 
Large farms  -1333.94  -1340.55  -1160.25  -1112.96 
Income gain due to labor supply response  3 ˆ ( 1)
LS
h X if LS β =  
Total sample  865.41  1298.12  1298.12  1730.83 
Total effect of the shock ( ) 3 0 1 2 3 4 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆS S A LS L
h h h h h Y X X X X β β β β β = + + + +   1 if LS =  
Total sample  -194.53  252.30  208.65  610.20 
Total effect of the shock ( ) 3 0 1 2 3 4 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆS S A LS L
h h h h h Y X X X X β β β β β = + + + +   0 if LS =  
Total sample  -1160.86  -953.28  -941.46  -699.19 
Number of households that reported a crop loss in 1993 = 163 
Number of households that adopted the labor supply response in 1993 = 64 
Note. The table presents the descriptive statistics of the measures of income loss due to 
the crop loss and income gains due to coping strategies.  
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5.2  Consumption equation estimates 
As previously noted, our aim is to examine whether consumption behavior in the face of a 
crop loss differs according to the level of asset ownership. Hence, we estimate the marginal 
propensity  to  consume  out  of  both  permanent  and  transitory  income,  focusing  on  the 
differences between asset poor and non-poor farmers. Results of equation (16) are reported in 
table 6
23.  
A  first  result  is  related  to  the  income  measure  which  appears  to  be  relevant  for  the 
consumption  choices  of  poor  and  non-poor  farmers.  According  to  the  permanent  income 
hypothesis, consumption is determined by permanent income and should be unaffected by 
transitory  income  changes.  Our  estimates  suggest  that  consumption  of  medium and  large 
farms is indeed determined by permanent income, while the crop loss has no impact on non-
durable expenditures
24. Instead, consumption of small farms is influenced by both permanent 
and transitory income: coefficients on both types of income are significant (and similar). The 
implications of this result for consumption smoothing are better grasped if we consider the 
difference in the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of permanent and transitory 
income. As suggested by Deaton (1997), a statistically positive difference between these two 
coefficients would represent evidence that households are willing/able to smooth consumption 
relative to income. This result is confirmed for medium and large farms (p-value=0.000), but 
not for small farms. Indeed, the estimated coefficients on permanent income, crop loss, and 
extra labor income on consumption for small farms are not statistically different (test for the 
equality of the three coefficients: F(2,2162)=0.84, Prob>F=0.43)
25. 
A  second  distinction  between  poor  and  non-poor  households  is  the  magnitude  of  the 
marginal propensity to consume out of the relevant income measure. Rich farmers and owners 
of medium farms consume about 90% and 70% of their permanent income respectively
26. The 
marginal propensity to consume out of current income for poor households is about 0.5
27, 
                                                
23  Five  outliers  which  belong  to  the  top  percentile  of  the  expenditure  distribution  are  excluded  from  the 
expenditure regression. All the results reported in table 6 are robust to different definitions of poor and non-poor 
farmers. Defining the poor as those who belong to the lowest 20% or 30% of farm asset distribution, instead of 
the lowest 25%, gives similar results. 
24 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of the shock on consumption is the same for medium and large 
farms (F(1,2161)=0.80, Prob>F=0.373). Hence, we pool the two groups.  
25 Flavin (1985) explores whether the empirical rejection of the permanent income hypothesis occurs because 
agents  are  myopic,  or  because  some  agents  face  liquidity  constraints.  She  finds  that  the  observed  excess 
sensitivity of consumption to current income is due to liquidity constraints. The extent to which consumption is 
affected by the presence of borrowing constraints is examined also by Zeldes (1989).  
26 The marginal propensities to consume out of permanent income for medium and large farms are statistically 
different (F(1,2162)=3.69, Prob>F=0.055). 
27 Test on coefficients:  
a)  extra labor income=crop loss=permanent income=0.5: F(3,2162)=0.69, Prob>F=0.559   20 
with the consequence that about one half of the current income is transferred into savings
28. 
This is in line with what is suggested by the literature: when excluded from financial markets, 
poor households have to perform an autarchic saving strategy, to build a buffer stock of assets 
and to self-finance profitable investments (Barrett and Carter 2005; Fafchamps 1999).  
The third result that emerges from table 6 is that different coping strategies that change 
current income, have different  impacts on consumption for poor  households. The income 
generated by the measures “non-business assets” and “take a loan or sell assets”, is entirely 
used to mitigate the consumption reduction due to the crop loss, even if these measures have 
only  a  marginal  role  in  compensating  the  income  loss
29.  As  noted  above,  the  marginal 
propensity to consume out of extra labor income is about 0.5, and statistically lower than the 
one estimated for the other measures.  
                                                                                                                                                   
b)  extra labor income=crop loss=permanent income=0.7: F(3,2162)=4.80, Prob>F=0.002. 
28 Using data from rural Burkina Faso, Kazianga and Udry (2004) find that about 50% of changes in transitory 
income are passed onto consumption, with no significant differences between poor and rich households. Jalan 
and Ravallion (1997) show that 40% of an income shock is passed onto current consumption for the poorest 
households, while rich households are protected from almost 90% of an income shock. 
29 Coefficients on “non-business assets” and “take a loan or sell assets” are not statistically different in the 
consumption equation and, hence, we aggregate the two variables.   
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Table 6 
Expenditure equation estimates 
Variables  Coef.   t 
ˆP
h Y -small farms  0.45  6.28 
ˆP
h Y -medium farms  0.71  7.71 
ˆP
h Y -large farms  0.91  10.19 
1ˆS
h Y - small farms  0.63  3.03 
1ˆS
h Y - medium/large farms  0.08  0.87 
2 4 ˆ ˆ ( )
A L
h h X X β β + -small farms  1.13  1.80 
3 ˆ LS
h X β - small farms  0.46  1.88 
Transitory positive income  1.20  5.70 
) 1 ( * ˆ CL h − ε   0.13  1.22 
CL uh * ˆ   0.36  6.13 
members aged 0-5  1.67  0.05 
members aged 6-11  185.31  4.72 
members aged 12-17  267.16  6.10 
members aged 18-64  225.93  6.74 
members 65 years or over  126.16  2.02 
Intercept  367.80  3.81 
R-squared= 0.33     
Number of obs= 2178       
Note. The table reports the results from equation (16). 
Dependent  variable  is  1993  non-durable  household 
expenditure. Standard errors are robust.   22 
6  Conclusions  
This work uses the 1993 round of the Indonesian Family Life Survey to explore whether 
Indonesian farmers respond differently to income shocks (crop loss) depending on the level of 
their asset ownership. We consider a framework in which assets contribute directly to the 
income  generation  process.  In  this  context  transitory  shocks  may  have  long  term 
consequences when the income loss leads to changes in the asset investment decisions.  
Various papers have shown the existence of an asset threshold below which households 
reduce consumption in order to preserve their stock of assets (asset smoothing). Other studies 
suggest that poor households smooth consumption by adjusting labor supply. In this paper we 
combine these two streams of literature by examining the role of the extra income generated 
by the labor supply response in the consumption and asset accumulation choices of poor 
households.  More  precisely,  we  construct  quantitative  measures  of  income  shocks  and 
households’ ability to cope with them, and we use these measures to estimate the marginal 
propensity to consume out of both permanent and transitory income. These estimates help us 
to understand which income measure drives household consumption behavior for the two 
groups, and whether permanent income is an appropriate welfare indicator for all households.  
The  theoretical framework  that  underlines  the  analysis  is  a  life-cycle model, in  which 
income includes farm profits and off-farm labor income. Productive and unproductive assets, 
together  with  an  exogenously  determined  amount  of  labor,  determine  farm  profits;  the 
remaining amount of time can be allocated to either leisure or wage market. A negative shock 
reduces profits (and the amount of farm labor) and increases the marginal utility of off-farm 
labor income. The model predicts that the marginal utility of leisure and of consumption are 
both greater when assets are below a household specific asset threshold. This implies that, in 
general, constrained households consume less and work more than if they were unconstrained, 
and these effects are even more pronounced in the face of a negative shock.  
The descriptive analysis suggests that the coping strategies adopted to overcome a crop 
loss are indeed quite different between asset poor and non-poor households. The latter are 
more likely to run down assets and to use savings, while the former are more likely to adjust 
their labor supply, even if the percentage of households that use extra labor is high in both 
groups. This evidence is supported also by the econometric analysis. Poor households that 
cannot rely on high and good-quality assets use labor supply to compensate the income loss 
and, on average, they succeed in doing it: the total effect of the shock – income loss plus 
income gains – for households that use the labor supply response is positive.   
  23 
As regard consumption behavior, there are two main differences between poor and non-
poor  households.  First,  while  medium  and  large  farms  smooth  consumption  relative  to 
income, this is not so for small farms: for the latter, the main components of transitory income 
(crop loss and the extra labor income) have an effect on consumption that is statistically 
significant  and  equal  to  the  one  associated  with  permanent  income.  This  means  that 
consumption  for  poor  households  is  driven  by  current  income,  and  therefore  permanent 
income is not an appropriate welfare indicator for them. The second distinction between poor 
and non-poor households concerns the marginal propensity to consume out of the relevant 
income measure: while the latter consume a fraction of their permanent income close to one, 
the former save about a half of their current income. More precisely, asset poor households 
transfer into savings half of their permanent and half of the extra labor income due to the 
labor supply response. Instead, the income gain from other coping strategies is not used to 
accumulate savings: what poor households receive from taking a loan or selling assets is 
entirely transferred onto consumption. 
These results confirm the need for poor households to accumulate assets, and suggest that 
in  this  case  policies  that  support  savings,  more  precisely  the  accumulation  of  productive 
assets, may be even more important than the development of labor markets.  
We expect these policy-implications to be relevant also for other countries, but it would be 
useful to confirm this intuition by carrying out similar analyses on different datasets.    24 
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Appendix 
Table A1 summarizes the sample characteristics for the main variables for small, medium 
and large farms. We can see that households with a low level of farm assets (small farms) are 
also poor in terms of non-farm assets and households income. There are no other significant 
differences between farms, except the number of household members with secondary and 
higher education.  
Table A2 summarizes the sample characteristics for the main variables included in the 
income regressions presented in tables A3 and 4. The mean for dummy variables represents 
the  proportion  of  that  group:  for  example,  81%  of  the  household  heads  work  as  self-
employed, and 13% as private or government workers. 26% of the heads are illiterate and 
35% did not complete the elementary level.  
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Table A1 
Sample means of household characteristics by 1992 value of farm assets 
  Bottom 25%  25-75%  Top 25% 
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Number of female adults 







Number of male adults 







Number of female adults 







Note. The table reports mean characteristics of farm households, by the size of the farm 
(quartiles of 1992 farm assets distribution). Income and assets are in thousands of rupiah. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* the difference in the means is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.    28 
 
Table A2 
Sample means of variables included in the income regression 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Shocks 
1993 Crop loss  0.08  0.26  0  1 
1993 Labor supply  0.03  0.17  0  1 
“take a loan or sell assets” (1993)  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Household economy  
Household income  970.97  1506.37  -100  18464 
1992 farm asset  5551.32  15204.49  0  268025 
1992 business assets  399.60  7811.01  0  356650 
1992 illiquid non-business assets  3936.08  9829.80  0  275430 
1992 liquid non-business assets  190.53  628.64  0  9500 
whether a household member 
receives a pension  0.02  0.13  0  1 
whether the household receives 
winnings  0.17  0.38  0  1 
whether the household receives 
gifts  0.16  0.37  0  1 
Nr. of income earner other than 
the head  0.69  0.92  0  6 
Work status of the household head 
Head is inactive  0.05  0.21  0  1 
Head is employed  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Head is self-employed  0.81  0.39  0  1 
Head is family worker  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Education of the household head 
Head unschooled  0.26  0.44  0  1 
Head incomplete primary  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Head completed primary  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Head secondary education  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Head higher education  0.02  0.12  0  1 
Household size  4.59  2.01  1  16 
Electricity in the village  0.76  0.43  0  1 
Note. The table reports the sample means of key variables used in the income equations. 
Household income and assets are in thousands of rupiah. 
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Table A3 
Income equation estimates 
(for households that did not report a crop loss in 1993) 
Variables  Coeff.  t 
Permanent income variables      
1992 farm assets*dummy small farm  -0.44  -1.99 
1992 farm assets*dummy medium farm  0.02  0.94 
1992 farm assets*dummy large farm  0.02  4.41 
1992 business non-farm assets  0.01  3.87 
1992 non-business assets  0.03  3.14 
Head employee  1207.49  8.71 
Head self-employed  171.95  1.93 
Head complete primary educ  84.78  1.44 
Head secondary educ  819.31  6.20 
Head higher educ  1899.87  4.20 
Number of income earners   151.55  4.32 
Pension (if someone receives a pension)  1279.46  3.60 
Household size   140.95  3.32 
Household size squared   -10.91  -2.80 
Electricity in the village  83.07  1.48 
Intercept  -262.86  -1.51 
Positive transitory income variables     
Winnings  381.71  3.99 
Gift  146.27  2.01 
Number of obs= 2020 
F( 28, 1991) =  16.34 
R-squared=  0.37 
Note. The table presents the results from equation (9) and estimates the 
predicted income for households that did not report a crop loss in 1993. 
Dependent variable is 1993 household income. This regression includes 
also  provincial  dummies.  Both  income  and  assets  are  measured  in 
thousands of rupiah. Standard errors are robust.  
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Table A4 
Probit equation for the labor supply response 
Variables  Coeff.  z 
Land value  -0.00004  -3.44 
Dummy if credit in village  -0.30  -2.43 
Proportion of other households experiencing 
a crop loss in the same village   1.17  3.64 
Age of household head   -0.02  -3.43 
Nr. of adult members with secondary 
education   -0.14  -1.81 
Nr. of females aged 13-17  0.22  1.95 
Spouse is inactive  -0.36  -2.69 
Poor soil quality in village  0.38  2.03 
Average soil quality in village  0.41  2.79 
intercept  0.25  0.91 
Number of obs=532 
Pseudo R-squared = 0.11 
Percentage correctly predicted = 64.85 
Note. The table reports the results from the probit regression that estimates the 
probability of responding with labor supply to a crop loss. Dependent variable 
is a dummy that equals one if the household had a labor supply response in the 
face of a crop loss over the period 1988-93. 
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